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Michael R. Griffiths
“The Tame from the Wild”: Handling Political Economies of 
Life at the Emergence of Capital 
[I]f Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property, the men will 
see to the fields, but who will see to the house? . . . it is absurd to argue, from the 
analogy of animals, that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals 
have not to manage a household. — Aristotle, Politics, Bk. II. (1152)
It presently occurr’d to me,  that I must keep the tame from the wild . . . and the only 
way for this was to have enclosed some Piece of Ground . . . This was a great 
Undertaking for one Pair of Hands. — Defoe, Robinson Crusoe (106)
At least since Aristotle, representations of animality in fictions of the economy have skirted the 
bounds of allegorical and mimetic modes or (to employ a distinction consonant with the old terms 
of the Great Chain of Being) those of analogy and emulation.1 For Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, 
animals as living beings must be consigned to the status of “tame” chattel property. They are also 
relied upon as the bases for economic arguments from the “analogy of animals.” Inscriptions of 
species difference in such arguments often conceal material origins within genres that appear 
entirely analogical or allegorical. At times, ironically, scholarly efforts to address human 
representations of animals consistently risk reducing the animal to a figment of the human 
imaginary even as the gesture that performs this reduction is itself the product of an ethical 
imperative. As we all know, the tension between ethics and anthropocentrism has been the subject 
of much debate in the burgeoning study of non-human animals. The question has been, to a degree 
vexed and difficult partly because the very study of animality automatically questions the 
foundations of what people think of as ethics. Ethics then appears as monstrous, but so, too, does 
the attempt to rethink it beyond the humanist paradigm. 
For example, during a roundtable discussion held at the 2008 Annual Convention of the Modern
Language Association, entitled “The Future of Animal(ity) Studies,” the conveners provided 
panelists with a guiding distinction between animality studies—critique of animal representation 
in human discourse—and animal studies, more directly concerned with the materiality of animal
life.2 Although both approaches were taken seriously scholars who identify with the animal studies 
side of this distinction have at times been dismissive of the anthropocentrism of animality studies,
as if the risk implied by the analysis of human discourse necessitated a downfall into
anthropocentrism. 
Donna Haraway, for instance, has questioned Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of “the 
autobiographē of the human species,” arguing that it gives no attention to the material question of 
actual animals.3 While it may be the case that critical followers of Derrida’s deconstruction of the 
question of the animal risk a reflexive emphasis on humanism, it does not necessarily follow that 
address to the animal “outside representation” constitutes the study of a ding an sich beyond the 
grasp of anthropocentric discourse.4 I do not point this out in order to suggest that the opening of 
recent theoretical analysis onto empirical study of real animals is not valuable. Taking the material 
and ethical question of the animal seriously is clearly invaluable. I want to suggest, however, that 
the relation between the figural and the material by which living things are made subjects or 
objects is more complex than has hitherto been suggested by those who seek, implicitly or 
explicitly, to deauthorize the animality studies wing of human-animal studies. In cross-mapping 
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fiction, material events, and philosophical discourse, it becomes clear that allegories of animality 
are not simply mimetic, though neither are they entirely floating and dereferential. For Richard 
Nash, animal discourse forms rather “a pre-existing mythological terminology actually shaped by 
preconceptions and hence perceptions by which real beings were observed and recognized by 
Europeans” (Wild Enlightenment 3). One could say, for instance, that “real beings” do not pre-
exist enlightenment humanist representational economies with their “mythological terminology.” 
The task of disentangling this relation between real and imagined, allegorical and ethically 
immediate already opens onto a further double bind, since such  a task immediately faces both the 
specific historic context of an allegory’s inscription and apparently distinct philosophical and 
ethical stakes that inevitably refer to the immediacy of the present. 
One sees in my opening epigraphs a distinction between tame and wild animals in Defoe that is 
highly reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction between forms of property in the fields and in the 
house—in other words a distinction that crosses the human and the non-human, as well as the 
gender, race, and citizen status of the inhabitants of a territory. Such figuration also organizes and 
is reorganized by the shifting categorizations of real beings that traverse the overlapping 
discourses of taxonomy and political economy. Considering the economic and religious changes 
that lead to the rearticulation of these categories, one finds that classical forms of subjection and 
economic categorization are both retained and rearticulated within enlightenment humanist 
discourse. 
In Aristotle’s Politics the taxonomy of living beings schematizes the management of non-living 
things in the household and those in the fields—at the farthest reaches of dominion. This “absurd” 
analogical praxis continues through the modern era. One key distinction that will be retained in 
Britain as late as Daniel Defoe’s 1720s operatively divides chattel property from the family 
property system of the landed. The designation of chattel property is never limited to actual 
“cattle,” nor is the mysterious space of the house made up only of the family—those inhabiting the 
dominion of a pater familius. Such ambivalences in the categorization of life demand multiple 
genealogies. Here, my explication of these ambivalences and transformations will be anchored 
around a reading of Robinson Crusoe since this text can be read not only as an event in the history 
of English literature—for instance, in what Ian Watt has famously called the rise of the novel—but 
also in that of political economy.5 Mining Crusoe’s futurity, one easily uncovers numerous 
examples of this curious travelogue’s influence on the rhetoric of political economy. Robinson’s 
isolation on his island will come to hold a paradigmatic importance for Jean-Jacques Rousseau.6 
Marx also famously observed that “Robinson Crusoe’s experiences are a favorite theme with 
political economists” (Capital 47). And this is to name but two well known examples. 
The advent of Robinson Crusoe in enlightenment intellectual history connects the emergence of 
property with that of biopolitics. By referring to the concept of biopolitics in a discussion that 
began with Aristotle I mean to invoke Michel Foucault’s famous contention that while “[f]or 
millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity 
for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living 
being in question” (History 144). While such critics as Nash and Phillip Armstrong have 
addressed the importance of Robinson Crusoe to the study of non-human animals in 
enlightenment discourse, it is life’s transforming place in the discourses of value that I examine in 
this essay. While I deploy my argument with reference to contemporary contexts, I aim to 
implicate such eighteenth-century animal representation in an emergent biopolitical economy with 
a series of ethical and political consequences for the history of the present that concern humans 
and non-humans alike. The elusive taxonomy of species and value one finds in Crusoe will remain 
all the way to the present, making one aware of the unwieldy basis of the economy of the living 
and the non-living, human and non-human, person and thing. Economic allegories of tameness 
and wildness cross the species divide and they do so through a concept of property that is always, 
on some level, metaphoric. As Gilles Deleuze has argued, for David Hume at least, “nature is the 
principle of resemblance and uniformity” produced within the empirical human subject that 
emerges at the twilight of the renaissance (Empiricism 47). For Hume it is “property” that 
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“engenders and develops inequality” and the rules produced by this regime of property “will be 
the object of political economy” (op. cit. 51). Following nineteen years on the heels of Robinson 
Crusoe’s first appearance, Hume’s sense that humans are the product of a social constructionism 
rooted in property reveals an instance of what Robert Marzec has called the “syndrome” of 
Robinson Crusoe as it is carried into the nineteenth- and twentieth-century intensification of the 
private. 
Nonetheless, since the present essay aims to further far-reaching assertions about the economic 
form of life’s subjugation, any risk of anachronism must be explained and defended. I began with 
Aristotle because of the strange similarity between his early division of the things of the fields 
from those of the house and a division that I will identify in Defoe’s text. Nonetheless classical 
economy is not modern capitalism. Animality and slavery are not transcendent Platonic universals 
but are produced and reproduced within the discursive structure of a given system of power—what 
Foucault called a social apparatus, or dispositif.7 This is to say, that shared schematism does not 
apply a historically transcendent biopolitics, but one whose vicissitudes rely (at least in part) on 
modern forms of economics, which is to say: the rise of imperialism and capitalism. So, while 
invoking a historical comparison, I want to emphasize that I am wary of transplanting the 
Aristotelian economy of man, woman, slave, and animal across geographically or temporally 
distinct contexts. I prefer to stress the way continuities (as well as breaks) have continually 
recurred in economizations of life. Whereas followers of the earlier Foucault have been wary of 
the risk of economism, Giorgio Agamben has recently observed that “[t]he Latin term dispositio, 
from which [Foucault’s] French term dispositif, or apparatus, derives” also etymologically 
connects to the “semantic sphere of the theological oikonomia” (Apparatus 11). The study of 
biopolitics can benefit a lot from examining the economics of the dispositif of enlightenment 
humanism, its antecedents, and legacy.8
Defoe had manifestly espoused his assent to the connection between economic dominion and the 
divine ordering of species difference when he wrote in The Review that without “the subjection . . . 
to the useful part of man” of “the useful part of creatures . . . tame, docile, tractable, and 
submissive,” humans would be overrun by “the less needful part . . . left wild and at war with 
us” (qtd. in Armstrong 44),  Were this the case, he asserts, “what would it give to trade, what a 
universal stop to all manner of commerce!” (ibid.).  As an influential early eighteenth-century 
figuration of animal property, Robinson Crusoe reflects and portends shifts in the dispositif by 
which forms of life would come to be assigned value in the enlightenment.
Handling Animality and Biopolitics. In making these claims about the intersection of animal
allegory, political economy, and biopolitics through a reading of Defoe’s text, it is necessary to 
recall certain recent critiques of humanism that center around the biopolitics of the figural hand 
and situate them next to the hand’s place in early eighteenth-century thought. The use of animals 
as metaphors for kinds of property has lurked in the margins of a number of recent and influential 
critiques of humanism. Derrida famously linked the metaphor of the hand with the epistemology 
of the sacrificial structure of enlightenment humanism, or, carnophallogocentrism. In 
deconstructive terms, this epistemology of distinction focuses on Heidegger’s retention of the 
hand as a mark of humanist thought, particularly à propos the exclusionary potential it retains 
within his destruktion of humanist metaphysics.9 Cary Wolfe has argued that the hand in this 
philosophical genealogy is but one in a series of signs of species difference.10 
Ann Van Sant has argued that Defoe’s subversion of the “hierarchy of head and hand” in Crusoe
reflects the Georgic revolutionary reintroduction of “a long tradition supported by authority from 
both Greek and Latin antiquity” (121). Van Sant notes the coincidence in Crusoe’s figural hands 
of usages which place Lockean labor alongside exaltations of power and sovereignty. In Van 
Sant’s account, the discursive unwieldiness of human social hierarchy exceeds both the 
terminology of earlier intra-aristocratic emphasis on status and emergent hierarchies of 
socioeconomic class distinction. Van Sant concludes by insisting that the oscillation of the hand 
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between categories of difference and hierarchy shows “the persistence of the concept of a status-
based society well after social and economic relations had ceased being governed by status” (132). 
However Van Sant’s account does not triangulate these claims about discursive shifts between 
class and status with the formation of the human. This is surprising since Derrida, Haraway, 
Wolfe, Armstrong, and Nash, in varying ways show animality to be a central enlightenment hinge. 
For Derrida, this transformation forms in the late eighteenth century and will root itself in the 
phenomenology that follows. “There is,” Derrida remarks, “a Kantian hand, and there will be a 
Husserlian hand and a Heideggerian hand . . . which will have traits in common but do not 
overlap” (On Touching 149). Bringing Derrida’s contention into dialogue with Van Sant’s, we 
could assert that there is also an early-eighteenth century hand that manifests through Locke’s and 
Defoe’s texts and connects economics and the body. In light of the Derridean critique of 
humanualism, the hand’s privileging of certain labor forms in early eighteenth century economic 
thinking entails not only distinctions among human socio-economic categories (class, status), but, 
I will argue, traces an emergent nexus of species and race-based differentiations, for which 
economic distinctions cannot be disentangled from perceived biological and ontological forms of 
life (185). 
Recent discussions of biopolitics have emphasized the relation between the body and its 
foundational character for modern notions of property. Stressing the corporeal dimensions of 
Lockean property, Roberto Esposito points out that the extraction of individualism from a 
monotheistic Commonwealth hinges on the foundational coincidence of the body and property.11 
Lockean individualism founded in the “property in [one’s] own person,” is corporealized through 
its prosthetic mode of extraction—“the labour of [the] body and the work of the hands” (Locke 
287). Esposito connects the hand to property through a discussion of Kant’s introduction of 
liquidity to political economy via the continued persistence of the figural hand as its support. In 
Kant’s conception, property need not be literally held in hand in order to be individualized—that 
is, justified as an individual possession. For Kant, the hand’s absenting from direct connection to 
property becomes the underpinning of moveable goods and of the pecuniary by extension 
(Esposito 69). Since, as Van Sant has argued, Defoe’s text subverts the primacy of mental over 
manual labor, Defoe’s text must also reposition the conditions under which beings are made the 
subjects of power. However, as revealing as it is, the biopolitical character of political economy, 
and the status of animal bodies is not apparent within the textual trajectory that Esposito traces 
from Locke to Kant. Through a semiotics of animality’s relation to the hand and body of the 
sovereign, Defoe’s text repositions Lockean notions of sovereignty, property, and liberty. It 
behooves one to note that the relative tameness of animals, as well as the relatively economic 
practices of non-Europeans was initially subject to the relative ability or inability of Europeans to 
show sympathy to other forms of life. As Deleuze notes, sympathy is not a phenomenological 
given but, as was recognized by Defoe’s eighteenth-century contemporary, Hume, takes form 
according to the social apparatus that produces it, which is to say at that time, political economy 
(Empiricism 37-54). As Hume further emphasized, “society is in the beginning a collection of 
families” (op. cit. 39).
Production: Pecuniary Chattels and the Figure of the Goat. As Armstrong has suggested, the 
preponderant influence of Cartesian thought meant that European travelers normatively assumed 
that non-humans and non-Europeans alike could not easily be grasped conceptually. However they 
could certainly be grasped and commodified via the hand of homo oeconomicus (17-22). The 
incarceration of life by the “Hand” is always already an act of detention, as at the moment when, 
“in a great undertaking for one Pair of Hands,” Crusoe breeds up a “He-Goat . . . tame as one of 
the Kids . . . to supply myself with Goat-Flesh . . . [so] perhaps I might have them about my House 
like a Flock of Sheep”(RC 106). Kant’s detentio is property without the necessity of possession, 
whereby “I possess it, although I have laid it out of my hand, and wherever it may lie” (Armstrong 
13). Crusoe’s detention of his goats anticipates Kant’s humanualist assertion, showing the reliance 
of early colonial adventures on this humanist political economy of the confinement of non-
humans. 
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Shortly after enclosing his goats in this way, Crusoe steps back to survey the order of his kingdom 
of non-human subjects, remarking on his status as his “Majesty the Prince and Lord of the whole 
Island” (RC 108). He then begins to enumerate the roles of the various subjects around his table:
Poll, [Crusoe’s parrot] as if he had been my Favourite, was the only one permitted to 
talk to me. My Dog who was now grown very old and crazy, and had found no 
Species to multiply his Kind upon, sat always at my Right Hand, and two Cats, one 
on one Side the Table and one on the other, expecting now and then a Bit from my 
Hand, as a Mark of special Favour. (RC 108)
Where are the goats once Crusoe and his “little family sit down to dinner” (RC108)? Where are 
the goats whom Crusoe has painstakingly bred and housed—beginning with the first Kid whom he 
“sav’d” alive from his “Dog” (RC 81, 105-107)? What is the meaning of the absence of cattle—
and therefore, chattel—animals from this scene of a family made up entirely of non-humans? As 
Armstrong notes, only the first goat finds itself in the family circle (41). Crusoe takes pity only on 
the first exceptional goat which “became so loving, so gentle, so fond, that is became . . . one of 
my Domesticks also” (RC 82). 
One can identify the liminal statuses of the animals in Crusoe’s dominion by noting historical and 
biographical resonances, for instance, the connection between Crusoe and his “real-life avatar, 
Alexander Selkirk,” a castaway who was rescued from Juan Fernàndez Island several years prior 
to the publication of Defoe’s book (Armstrong 13). Yet the mimetic sources for Crusoe are an 
explanatory means and not an exhaustive end. Selkirk, who according to the first published 
account of him “tam’d some wild Goats and Cats”(RC 230)—was doubtless a source for Defoe. 
But, as Nash puts it, “beyond the already well-travelled ground of the Selkirk-Crusoe affinity,” the 
implications of the interspecies castaway narrative can be deciphered through reading practices 
beyond the biographical and mimetic. Since “both islands and their animal populations 
(particularly goats) carry special significance” for enlightenment models of economy and 
taxonomy (Nash 67). As Nash reminds us, “[t]he goats that populated Selkirk’s island refuge, and 
which Crusoe domesticates, represented in eighteenth-century natural history a liminal creature 
between wild and tame, savage and domestic” (87). 
The solitary human at table, Crusoe excitedly observes, “How like a King I din’d” (RC 116). This 
performance of sovereignty over his little family follows the goat’s domestication and the 
banishment of its offspring to the compound.12 The narrative trail left by goats in Defoe’s text 
leads back to the earliest classical division of dominion—between the things of the family and 
those of the fields.13 As Ian A. Bell observes, Lockean thought of dominion conditions Defoe’s 
figuration of Crusoe’s sovereignty. The etymology of dominion finds its root in domus, the home. 
In the Leviathan, Hobbes reinvigorated the connection between dominion and property, insisting 
that: “[t]hat which in speaking of goods and possessions is called an owner, and in Latin dominus . 
. . The Right of possession, is called Dominion” (218). If one foregrounds the slippage between 
the microscopic family dominion of Crusoe’s experiment, and the impersonal connection with 
territory over which the sovereign casts his gaze, we arrive at an aporia that fails to manageably 
separate Crusoe’s paternal power over property and his Sovereign power—the wider sense of 
Dominion. 
As was the case for Aristotle, in Defoe’s allegory dominion, sovereignty, and paternal power are 
not discrete but are rather connected by a metonymic displacement. As Michel Foucault rightly 
notes, the metaphoric relation between family and state will come to recede into a custodial power 
over subjects, which, in Defoe’s allegory, are non-human.14 Bell argues that while Friday is called 
a slave, his relation to Crusoe also borders on the status of an autonomous subject. In Robinson 
Crusoe, the goat functions as the prototype for the chattel slave whose value is coincident with its 
conditions of life.15 This is why the first captured kid must be nursed: made to live by the 
sovereign rather than let die in order to be rendered manageable (RC 105).16 Not only is the goat 
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taxonomically liminal, it is immediately connected to Europe’s outside, “the proliferating goats . . 
. [call] out for the civilizing touch of European cultivation” (Nash 83). As Alfred Crosby notes, 
Spanish, Portugese, and English maritime travelers used Atlantic islands as stations for 
replenishment in the long voyages to the New World and around the Cape of Good Hope. For this 
reason, these explorers made a practice of seeding these islands with familiar species, for instance 
in the Canaries, as they conquered each isle “[t]hey ‘Europeanized’ their island, importing species 
of Old World plants and animals” (Crosby 94). As Nash argues by reference to William 
Dampier’s journal, “in the various accounts that inform Defoe’s narrative, European species (rats, 
cats, and goats in particular) explode on Juan Fernàndez” (Nash 79),  to figure the global 
replication “of versions of Europe” (Crosby 89). 
The carnophallogocentric structure in Derrida’s sense emerges in the logic of slave and chattel 
subjectivity—a metaphorics of consumption troubled by this Gordian Knot of parallel 
subjugations. Before he has fully tamed and nursed his Kid in the realm of res familius, Crusoe 
asks God’s blessing for this meat he has placed his labor upon through hunting—recalling the 
primal scene of non-European (“Indian”) labor in Locke’s Second Treatise (RC 91).17 Crusoe 
rhetorically invokes the tension between individualism and commonwealth, asking “[c]an God 
spread a Table in the Wilderness?” (RC 94). Such ritual expenditure begins to take on an 
increasingly outmoded role in the novel, as Crusoe better encloses his land and fixes the property 
forms designating the subjects in his compound. Prior to Friday’s emergence as “slave,” the 
“Savage People who sometimes haunted this Island” produce for Crusoe the specter of 
humanualist economy’s primitive other through “Print of a Man’s Foot” (RC 126). In response to 
the foot, Crusoe immediately accelerates his handy work of enclosing his compound, “that I might 
not fall into the Hands of the barbarians” (RC 125). The attempt at global self-replication that 
Crosby identifies with early modern European expansion can also be read in Derrida’s terms as 
the “globalatinization” of religious and economic thought of property (Cosmopolitanism 32). 
This cross-cultural Christianization of economy recalls the degree to which, as Agamben noted,
Foucault’s narrative of the emergence of apparatuses of subjection is closely connected to the 
“theological oikonomia” in monotheistic logics of economy. In more recently translated writings 
on biopolitics, Foucault connects such apparatuses of control over life as the science of population 
with the rise of capitalism. For the later Foucaultian genealogy, the sovereign’s direct connection 
to the wealth of the state recedes, yet his power over his subjects functions increasingly through 
the management of subjects via population modeling—a form of power consonant with the 
emergent imperative to avoid the direct governance of markets.18 As property becomes private, it 
refuses the common logic that referred to the divinely guaranteed sovereign. Yet sovereignty’s 
multiplication of biopolitical projects nonetheless refers to its subjects as forms of life with 
economic potential. 
In the Politics, Aristotle distinguishes such instruments of production as the sowing shuttle—
which facilitates a limited number of tasks—from instruments of action. Aristotle designates the 
“slave” a living possession, capable of instrumentality but possessed of potential to act only qua 
instrument (BW 1135-37). What Aristotle withholds from the slave is not potential [potenza], but 
the dynamic form of potential [dynameia]. For this reason, Aristotle says the slave has no 
autonomy: no capacity for reflective action. The distribution of kinds of property relies at once on 
their spatial orientation—whether through detentio or in proximity to the hand—and the related 
division of forms of life by their varying potentials. 
Defoe’s text stands at the hinge of the two key breaks in Foucault’s genealogy. Crusoe is at once
sovereign of a kingdom—guarantor of the wellbeing of his subjects—and father in dominion of 
these same subjects, their direct owner. Crusoe’s goats display neither dynamic potential, nor the 
related autonomy ascribed to companions like the parrot. Crusoe’s cats, as I have said, receive the 
expenditure of “special favours” from his hand, while nonetheless remaining simultaneously 
subjects and property. Yet these little things of the family are not property in the sense Aristotle 
ascribed to a sowing-shuttle, nor are they mere instruments of use and exchange. The absent goats 
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are more particularly chattel property than the difficulty to classify cats, who receive special favor, 
or the parrot who speaks.19 Defoe’s sacrificial economy renders the goat a “living Magazine of 
Flesh, Milk, Butter and Cheese” (RC 111). Following Derrida, we might say that the 
carnophallogocentric structure of consumption and sacrifice is allegorized through the goat’s 
reduction to a “living magazine.” The liminal taxonomic status with which the goats are shackled 
foregrounds not only the limits Nash saw in eighteenth-century natural history, but also limits in 
the related rethinking of property’s mobility. 
As it is figured in Crusoe, such globalatinization of the sacrificial economy is a reiteration of the 
Aristotelian distinction between domestic and agrarian property, which forms a basic tenet in 
Roman Law through the distinction between res familia and res pecunia. For Marcel Mauss the 
Roman economics of “things” was subject to a binary based on a primary spatial distinction that 
founds roman law (nomos).20The material resonance of the distribution of animality in space is 
clear for the nature of the distinction wherein “things were of two kinds. A distinction was made 
between familia and pecunia, between the things of the household . . . and the cattle subsisting in 
the fields, far from the stables” (Mauss 49). For Locke, the hand facilitated property grounded in 
the body’s immediate labor—“the work of the hands.” But Crusoe’s initial work of enclosure, he 
has established the detentio of the goats, which renders them movable property no longer reliant 
on the hand. Through the manual, Crusoe facilitates the feeding of the bit to cats, the “mark of 
special favor.” In approaching animals, manual labor is something from which the master of 
dominion is increasingly removed. We can find the same logic in the Roman legal system from 
which it is derived:
A distinction was also made between the res mancipi and the res nec mancipi, 
according to the forms of sale. As regards the former, which are made up of precious 
things, including immovable goods and even children, no disposal of them could take 
place save according to the precepts of the mancipatio, the ‘taking (capere) in hand . . 
. The things that did not fall under the mancipatio are precisely the small livestock in 
the fields and the pecunia, money, the idea, word and form of which derived from 
cattle and sheep. (49-50)
The res familia creatures most properly inhabit the proprietary sphere of the house, where the 
goats enclosed in the compound are pecunia creatures: a “living magazine” capable of producing 
further fungible goods. Within Crusoe’s dominion, but banished from his family dinner, the goats 
can be owned without being in proximity of the hand and can be exchanged readily and fungibly. 
Crusoe’s goats are both res pecunia and res nec mancipatio. 
Within this order, the goat is not born, but made pecuniary by “the work of Hands.” Afterward, 
the hand becomes an increasingly symbolic mechanism of labor. If we continue to take Robinson 
Crusoe as at once an allegorical musing on forms of animal property and an event in the history of 
political economy, then the vicissitudes of the goat foreground the text’s exemplification of this 
initial proprietary distinction in the state of nature (where, as Marx points out, exchange is always 
potential) (Marx 47-50). Crusoe’s domination of goats allegorizes the transformation of forms of 
life—be they goats, or slaves—into forms of property. As such, Goats must be made immobile 
and incapable of escape, ironically in order for them to become the most dispensable (and 
therefore mobile) instantiation of living property. Towards the end of Crusoe’s diary, he notes:
  
Dec. 27. Kill’d a young Goat, and lam’d another so as that I catch’d it, and led it 
Home in a string; when I had it Home, I bound and splinter’d up its Leg which was 
broke, N. B. I took such care of it, that it liv’d, and the Leg grew well, and as strong 
as ever; but by my nursing it so long it grew tame, and fed upon the little Green at my
Door, and would not go away: This was the first time that I entertain’d a Thought of 
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breeding up some tame creatures, that I might have Food when my Powder and Shot 
was all spent. (RC 56)
Within the structure of narration the first goat on the island is rendered chattel and pecunia 
through the nursing function of Crusoe’s hands, even as this function also carries out the laming of 
the animal to prevent its escape. Res pecunia is a structural position within which potential for 
instrumentality is attained through the sovereign’s custodial adaptation of the health and wellbeing 
of the body. By the time of the dinner of Crusoe’s “little family,” this process has progressed to 
facilitate the absence of the goats from his grasp. 
Reproduction is crucial to this process of rendering life subject to exchange. Crusoe’s final act “of 
conjuring” in relation to his island is to send wives back from England to his pagan subjects.21 
Some animals can be bred, others cannot. Crusoe’s dog, for instance, the not-quite-companion, is 
to die without progeny. The goats, on the other hand, are capable of producing useful 
exchangeable offspring. The production of such pecuniary items by the husbandry of goats is also 
necessary to the luxurious feast at the house—its enabling condition. Shortly after Crusoe has, for 
the “first time . . .  entertain’d a Thought of breeding up some tame Creatures,” he writes in his 
diary, “Jan. 3. I began my Fence or Wall; which being still jealous of my being attack’d by some 
Body, I resolved to make very thick and strong” (RC 76). Despite the apparent absence of other 
humans, Crusoe’s act of breeding goats necessarily entails the effective origination of enclosed 
land but not all of Crusoe’s experiments with the breeding of living subjects proceed as efficiently.
Consumption and the Family: Domesticating the Cat. Describing his little family’s history, the 
castaway introduces the strange pedigree of the cats:
The two Cats which I brought on Shore at first . . . were both of them dead, and had 
been interr’d near my Habitation by my own Hand; but one of them . . . multiply’d by 
I know not what Kind of Creature . . . [T]wo which I had preserv’d tame, whereas the 
rest run wild in the Woods, and became indeed troublesome to me at last. (RC 108)
Where the goats refer to a pecuniary system of exchange, the cats refer to a confused religious 
economy. Each animal codes a different aspect of the globalatinization, in Derrida’s terms, of 
economic forms. As Mauss notes, the etymology of the notion of res familia implies a privileged 
category of life where ownership is linked to gift-giving and religious sacrifice. Mauss observes 
that the survival of the sacral principle of the gift is coded in the etymology of the Latin word res 
(thing).22 The same Roman Legal form is preserved in the European feudal property system of 
domination and sovereignty: 
the nexum, the most ancient form of contract in Roman law, is already separated from the 
substance of collective contracts and also from the ancient system of gifts that commit one…
Things [according to this conception of nexum] are not the inert objects that the law of Justinian 
and our own legal systems conceive them to be. First they form part of the family: the Roman 
familia includes the res, and not only people  . . .  The best etymology of the word  familia is 
without a doubt that which compares it to the Sanskrit dhaman, “house.” (Mauss 49)
Thus, the family and its things were afforded a privileged place in the domestic space of the 
Roman nexum. Similarly, Crusoe’s domestic creatures possess, if not subjective autonomy, a 
privileged symbolic relation to the master through their very poverty of instrumentality: the parrot 
who speaks, the dog who sits at one’s right hand, the luxuriating cats who receive the “special 
favor” of the sovereign’s “Hand” a ‘Bit’ now and then. 
In Locke’s terms, the body’s relationship with property is a human universal. The “Indian” is as 
capable of extracting property from Commonwealth as the Christian European, since “the Law of 
reason makes the Deer, that Indian’s who killed it” (Locke 306). The marker of cultural difference 
between “the Indian” and the European parallels that already established between the subjects of 
res familia—figured by the domesticated allegorical cats, dogs, and parrots—and the absented 
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pecuniary goats. This marker is waste, where “as much as any one can make use of to any 
advantage of life before it spoils” is thereby that person’s property (op. cit. 308). Although 
“nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy,” any waste is simultaneously a sacrilege 
and a violation of the principles of emergent capitalism—whose economics computes only use 
and exchange. What Mauss shows in this rethinking is that the secular nexum divides forms of life 
into familial and “inert” pecuniary objects and that this process also facilitates modernity’s 
separation of religion and economy. 
In the history of privacy’s emergence in England and for English Imperialism abroad, one can say 
that what Marzec calls the syndrome of Robinson Crusoe changes with the changing status of the 
tithe. Tithing, the Christian remnant of sacral waste, was in diminution through the seventeenth 
century emplotted by Crusoe’s fictive memoir. As Laura Brace has argued, in the latter half of the 
seventeenth-century: 
debates between the advocates of enclosure and the defenders of commons centered 
on conflicting notions of property. [D]isentangling the fusion of economic, cultural 
and religious concerns, [the] opposition [to enclosure] focused on the improvers’ ideal 
of using the land to its utmost worth. They felt that this reflected a dangerous abuse of 
the common treasury and ran counter to God’s purposes … God was in control of the 
land itself rather than interested in its fruits and productivity. (Brace 78)
Nonetheless, it was the improver’s logic that became the norm for the economic individualism that 
would be espoused by the globalizing English church. The narrative by which Defoe renders his 
goats a signifier of res pecunia also allegorizes the transformation and enclosure of land in late 
seventeenth century England. The dynamic of Crusoe’s family at dinner permits useless 
expenditure only as a sign of sovereignty. This contradictory and covert retention of sacral 
expenditure will not be articulated until the twentieth century postulation of a gift exchange by 
Mauss or that of a general economy by Georges Bataille. Where, for Marx, enclosure signals only 
the emergence of private property, Crusoe’s “living magazine of Flesh” produces an 
individualizing function of privacy; this function operates through the sacrifice of life.23 The 
Christian logic of sacrifice was replaced through the late seventeenth and early eighteen centuries 
by new forms of non-productive circulation: the European commodity trade in luxuries and the 
credit economy. Crusoe’s cats refer to this transformation and by metonymic association 
complicate the figure of the “hand” in enlightenment economies of human exceptionalism.24
“God gave the World to Men in Common,” Locke recounts, “but since he gave it them for their 
benefit, and the greatest Conveniences of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be 
supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated” (Locke 309). Yet the 
Indian’s very mode of life is rendered intrinsically wasteful by a process of comparison within the 
logic of use and exchange which Locke has gradually been adopting. Since “an acre of land that 
bears here Twenty bushels of Wheat, and another in America, which, with the same husbandry, 
would do the like, are without a doubt, of the same natural intrinsick Value,” then Locke deduces 
that the appropriation of land from savages should logically follow (op. cit. 316). “[I]f,” Locke 
rejoins, “all the Profit an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here . . . it would 
scarcely be worth any thing.” In this way, the secularization of European economics parallels the 
“civilization” of the colonized. Crusoe’s goats figure enclosure in Europe and abroad. As such 
they figure the extraction of surplus value from the forms of life that populated enclosing 
commons of the imperial center which, as Crosby observes, were being transplanted to its new 
colonial domain. Equally they figure the insistence upon secular economy to which such figures of 
the sacral as Friday’s people—like Locke’s Indian—finds themselves subject. Taking a Bit from 
Crusoe’s “Hand” as a mark of “special favour,” the animals of Crusoe’s little family stand for the 
economic unwieldiness, which remains at the heart of the enclosing metropole.25 With the 
diminution of tithing in England, the sacral connotations of economics that still subsist within res 
familius undergo an alternate purge that sees them transformed into alternate economic forms. As 
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Carolyn Merchant argues, “enclosure represented for the English the most prevalent method of 
entering the market economy” (qtd. in Nash 80). 
Crusoe’s first encounter with animals is the discovery of a wild cat seated atop a chest recovered 
from the doomed vessel. “I found,” he says,
  
no Sign of any Visitor, only there sat a Creature like a wild Cat upon one of the 
Chests . . . I toss’d her a Bit of Bisket, tho’ by the Way I was not very free of it, for 
my Store was not great: However, I spar’d her a Bit, I say, and she went to it, smell’d 
of it, and ate it, and look’d (as pleas’d) for more, but I thanked her, and could spare no 
more; so she march’d off. (RC 41)
The “wild Cat” is fed a “Bit of Bisket” that should not be spared by the frugal Protestant 
colonialist. As I have argued, the feeding of the wild cat can be read as a sacrifice unjustifiable 
either in the emergent discourse of political economy or in any extant practice of the English 
Church. Where this exuberant expenditure could be thought in Bataille’s terms, it could 
contemporaneously have allegorized only the threat of either savage religion or popery. The store 
not being “very free of it” marks a curious exception in an allegory that plays out through the 
thrifty enclosure of this wild island.26 In certain colonial English dialects, from at least 1607, the 
word Bit could connote a number of kinds of coin, by
  
the eighteenth century the bit was generally the old Mexican real [equivalent] of a 
dollar or about 6d. sterling; later values assigned are a half pistareen or of a dollar, 
and (in some colonies) the value of 1d. sterling.27 
The signifier bit, then, while denoting a scrap of food in the both the early wild Cat scene and the 
scene at dinner can also be read to connote coin in this way: at the horizon of what, for the 
dictionary’s compilers, is a parenthesized emergent colonialism.28 In concert with the Bit, Crusoe's 
familial feline subjects gradually transform themselves into figures of luxury exchange. 
The figural pack of cats can be endlessly unpacked, so to speak. Theodore F.M. Newton first 
reconstructed Defoe’s abortive attempt to avoid debtor’s prison in 1692 by entering business as a 
civet farmer. A reference to Defoe in a Bankrupts Bill of 1706, reads: “He has run through the 
degrees of Comparison, Pos. as a Hosier; Compar. as a Civet-Cat Merchant; and Super. as a 
Pantile Merchant” (ctd. in Newton 10). Civets were a luxury item whose glands excreted a 
“buttery oil” from which could be produced “the base of a well-known perfume” (op. cit., 12-13). 
This was then “packed in bullock horns and shipped to the perfumers of Europe and America,” 
and, as Newton asserts, “there was a ready market for such an elixir” (op. cit. 10). Defoe’s 
apparent history with Civet Cats provides another way to read the connection of the figural cats to 
luxury trade, a fascinating context in light of the contemporary credit-driven economy that 
produced the South Seas Bubble of 1720. It also proffers an alternate way to read the furious 
breeding of the mad pack of cats on the Island that Crusoe cannot explain. The biographical 
resonance of Defoe’s own failed scheme to farm civet cats foregrounds luxury economics as the 
hinge between familiar European markets and the emergent global trade. As Armstrong argues 
“interbreeding between the ship’s cats and wild animals suggests their common origins [from] 
European ships” (35). The cats that Crusoe pays “special favor” to at table through a “bit” from 
his sovereign “Hand” are the hybrid offspring of European cats run wild in the colonial dominion 
of Crusoe’s making. In this way, the globalization of useless expenditure is both an export of 
European mercantilism that this project represses and an invention specific to the colonial project. 
Feeding the cats figures the necessity of investing liquid capital in luxury goods that—like civet 
cats—are themselves immutably fungible. Crusoe’s transformation of the island may suggest the 
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need for frugal husbandry and enclosure as a prerequisite to the sovereign enjoyment of 
domination. It also functions to compensate for the violence done to the goats, who become 
themselves an export of the European self.29 
As Brace argues, the diminution of the practice of tithing is a sign of the reduction of religious 
sacrifice as it inversely corresponds to the increasing enclosure of common lands. The cats emerge 
as a hybrid excess of the erasure of the Christian sacral. In relegating this excess to Europe’s 
outside, Crusoe’s cats mark the simultaneous outside to the emergent Protestant ethic via their 
connotation of the economics of excess and ritual and this, in turn, is figured through European 
and non-European others. In this light, we can begin to see the economic rationale (however 
irrational) of othered practices of excessive consumption that loom large in Defoe’s account, like 
cannibalism—one of Defoe’s key motivations for enclosing his compound (to avoid the “Hands” 
of savages and barbarians). 
While the tithe was consistently associated with the despised practices of the papacy, Defoe 
appears more concerned with the regulation of non-Christian forms than with fear of Popery.30 
Like the figural wildness of the cats, this feared religious alterity is to be managed through the 
hand—a manual metaphorics. In the Further Adventurers of Robinson Crusoe Crusoe happily 
joins with a Papist against the greater evil of the island’s new population of “Spaniards” who 
“were the main Body of the [island’s] Family” but have neglected to baptize their “savage” wives 
(1). In the Further Adventures the papist’s solution for ensuring the civilization of the island and 
of its place in Christendom is to “take the work out of the Hands” of Crusoe’s hybrid populace of 
savages, Spaniards, and wayward Englishmen (23). Before savages and “Idolaters” can corrupt 
them, the papist insists Crusoe should, “teach them the knowledge of the true God.” Here the 
“Hand” connects labor and proselytism at the foundation of commonwealth—indeed of pastoral 
care more generally. The metaphorics of the hand frames this categorization of people into forms 
of life wherein the pastoral actor in the wilds of foreign possessions is rewarded for his 
proselytizing efforts by the guarantee of future dominion. Pleased with his good works, Crusoe 
later notes, “it is a valuable thing indeed, to be an instrument in God’s Hand to convert seven and 
thirty Heathens to the knowledge of Christ” (26; emphasis added). In celebration for the 
sovereign’s return, Crusoe’s subjects roast five goat Kids (9). In the Crusoe fictions, the hand 
itself is refused manumission by its ongoing role in the economics of pastoral care from goat to 
slave to subject. Defoe’s reconciliation of labor and providence through metaphors of species 
property. Between the cat, the goat, and the hand that divides and binds them, figurations of 
animality and difference reveal the complementary emergences of economic subjection, religious 
transformation, and the taxonomy of life.
Cat-astrophe. Since I opened through Aristotle, it would do to temporarily return to the classical 
politics in order to ground the discussion. In the Poetics “the king” must be “the natural superior 
of his subjects” even as the subjects of his sovereign protection must also be “of the same kin and 
kind” as he (BW 1143). In order to be exchangeable, chattel beings like Crusoe’s goats are 
arbitrarily removed from the family, that is, from the status of kin. Yet in Defoe’s fiction the goats 
are the offspring of the first tame goat, which, we saw, became one of Crusoe’s “domesticks.” In 
narrativizing this paradox, Defoe’s “analogy of animals” succeeds in narrating the modern form of 
political subordination with precision. The goat Kid, like Friday are the first and most familiar 
creatures in a process of defamiliarization that estrange their offspring (which are clearly “of the 
same kin and kind”) to the status of inert possessions. In Crusoe, as I have argued, secular modern 
narratives of sovereignty and economy retain a metaphorics of descent and familiarity which 
thoroughly retains the residues of Christian individualism, even as they are converted into new 
symbolic forms. 
The taxonomy of exchangeable creatures that inhabits Defoe’s allegory portends the 
interdependence of biopolitical technologies in the modern global economy. In this newly 
reconstituted global nexum the form under which life is rendered property is politically central. 
These indeterminacies are foreshadowed by Defoe’s fiction, which has proven both influential and 
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prophetic. Animality and race mutually constitute the property form of the emergent global order 
dominated by first world capital. Here I want to signal some of the implications of the preceding 
examination of the figural animal economies in Crusoe, as they imply the emergence of this 
biopolitical property form of under modernity. 
Not until twentieth century engagements with non-European economies did the contradictions of 
Lockean and other English moral and political thought become clear. Bataille, for instance, 
famously argued that individualism—which he called sovereignty—is grounded in the 
transcendence of the human soul even as this soul is contradictorily grounded in an irreducibly 
animal body.31 More recently, Esposito asserts that a kind of quasi-religious transcendence 
continues covertly as the enabling of that least politically questioned category of person-hood. For 
Esposito, the “dispositif of the person” describes the inextricable religious and economic structure 
of individuation that operates in concert with the humanist paradigm. In the aporia between the 
human body and the horizon of transcendence lies the “person” whose dispositif “superimposes 
and juxtaposes humans as men and animals as men; or that distinguishes a part of man that is truly 
human from another that is bestial, that is enslaved to the first.”32 Esposito argues, “to be able to 
legitimately assert what we call subjective rights (at least in the modern juridical conception of 
rights), one needs beforehand to have penetrated the enclosed space of the person” (1),  the 
economic connotations of which should by now be immediately apparent. In bestowing and 
retracting familial status on the various beings in his dominion, Crusoe’s narrative acts out this 
tension between the possession of an “enclosed” personhood and the capacity to assert the 
protection and obligation of fellow beings. As an economic category that evades even the old legal 
reliance on embodiment the dispositif of the “person” remains in political operation even after 
humanist discourse claims to have extricated itself from its problematic race and gender biases. 
Within this dispositif, animals are hardly people too, to be sure. They are beings who rely on 
protections that citizens of the first world, as enclosed and enclosing persons, are immunized from 
affording them. I say first world citizens because it is not only non-human life (though this is 
categorically the case), but humans themselves who are affected by the contradictory production 
of personhood. It does not suffice to be a human in order to be treated as a person: a living being 
subject to sympathy and obligation. The modern form of pecuniary capital and the secular 
taxonomy of living property developed in the eighteenth-century can be seen as the beginning of 
the dispositif of the person for the Imperialist project of England and, to some degree, the models 
that it is produced in its wake. 
The hand remains a central figure in this relation. For Esposito, “figures of manumissio and 
mancipatio [are] unequalled in their capacity for coercison and creative flights.”33 The hand of the 
sovereign individual permits a continuity between the granting of the status of protection and 
partial freedom to others [manumissio] and the correlative form of possession and release with its 
connotation of economic proprietary [mancipatio]. Esposito draws out this partiality through its 
classical prehistory in Roman citizenship.34 But, as I have argued, the partiality of political 
subjectivity and its relation to the economization of sympathy is reorganized in the early 
eighteenth-century through allegorizations like that of the European traveller’s encounter with the 
non-human and the non-European. As I noted earlier (via Deleuze) it was Hume who first openly 
observed this emergent contradiction—as early as 1739.35 The initial model of the moral 
framework of obligation for Hume is the affective dimension of the family (Deleuze 39). As a 
conceptual tool for thinking society, Deleuze notes, families “exclude one another; they are partial 
(partiales) rather than made up of parts (partielles). The parents of one family are always the 
strangers of other families . . . The problem of society, in this sense, is not a problem of limitation, 
but a problem of integration.” The problem is that this enlightenment social logic of moral 
philosophy, like the Roman law from which it descends, does not contain a mechanism for 
inclusion. Like Crusoe’s compound, the English enlightenment’s model for sympathetic 
engagement with alterity in the sphere of politics and economy is mired in contradictory 
familiatories and favoritisms. This dynamic of differentiation emphasizes corporeal care over 
sovereignty as the general condition of a familiar or recognizable personhood: whose hidden 
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condition is the appearance of civilization. This is apparent insofar as it invades so many even 
well intentioned models of ethics and politics.36 
In the neocolonial order which Crusoe’s island nation-building portends the citizens find 
themselves consistently at risk of animalization.37 It is this risk of reduction to the status of virtual 
chattel, the relegation to the pecuniary position within the global dominion that traverses the 
category of human and animal in the dispositif of the person. Being a person within the secular 
public sphere of today’s global order still requires that one perform an enclosed, frugal 
individualism that, insofar as what Derrida calls globalatinization defines this order, remains 
Abrahamic. As Jean Joseph Goux notes, limning Bataille’s failure to penetrate capitalist society, 
“[p]roductive expenditure now entirely dominates social life. In a desacralized world, where 
human labor is guided in the short or long term by the imperative of utility, the surplus has lost its 
meaning” (208). The emergence of this person, immunized of all that is objectionable to the 
Abrahamic legacy coincides with the emergence of a politics for which the rational participation 
of reflective subjects as its basis. As Partha Chatterjee has recently argued, politics today 
“emphasizes the welfare and protection of populations . . . using similar technologies all over the 
world but largely independent of considerations of active participation by citizens in the 
sovereignty of the state” (47).
The problem with the political economic legacy of the Robinsonade is not only that the rational 
public sphere has not lived up to its egalitarian project but it is also that the neocolonialist 
architects of this global island continue to believe that it has. The tense relation between the 
familial and the pecuniary, between the kin and the essentially other, between the potential person 
and a “living magazine of flesh”—each of these early modern binaries pre-empts what Judith 
Butler identifies in the twenty-first century as “indefinite detention,” to which we all remain 
potentially subject. 38
Notes
Revision of this essay was precipitated with support from the Shirley Bard Rapoport Graduate 
Essay Prize. 
Many thanks are due to Betty Joseph, in whose graduate seminar many elements of the present 
essay were conceived, and of course to Cary  Wolfe, who continues to lend a generous ear to 
developments in my  thinking. Josh Kitching also deserves warm acknowledgement for his 
 always timely and thoughtful editorial remarks.
1.  cf. Foucault, The Order of Things, 21-29.
2. Colleen Glenney Boggs, Una Chaudhuri, Susan Mary Griffin, Ursula K. Heise, Michael S. 
Lundblad, Laurie Shannon, Cary Wolfe, The Future of Animal(ity) Studies, Panel 681, MLA 
Annual Convention, Monday 29 December, 2008.
3. cf. Haraway, 21; Derrida, “This Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow).” Trans. David 
Wills. Critical Inquiry. 28 (2001), 369-418.
4. I take seriously Cary Wolfe’s more thoroughgoing recent annotation of the complexities of 
dealing with non-human animals in a posthumanist manner. As well as complicating the terms of 
reference, this also implies a thoroughgoing skepticism of the temporality reified in historicist and 
even new historicist literary critical methodology.  Cf. Wolfe, “’Human, All too Human’: Animal 
Studies and the Humanities,’” PMLA 124:2 (2009), 564. I discuss this at greater length in my 
“Caveats for the Posthuman Past: Questions of Methodology in Eighteenth Century Animal 
Studies,” in ECTI 49 (2008), Supplement.
Page 13 of 18Griffiths: Spring 2010
2/05/2014http://www.depauw.edu/humanimalia/issue02/griffiths.html
5. Watt’s study makes the influential claim that privacy’s temporal and subjective conditions are 
brought into literary form. See Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson, and 
Fielding, U California P, 1977. Maximilian Novak had already established the centrality of 
economics to Defoe’s fiction in his Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe. James 
Thompson’s more recent account seeks to use the novel’s relation with economics for conjectures 
on the “modeling” of economics in anticipation of such postmodern eschewals of economic 
reference as one finds in the thought of Jean Baudrillard. Thompson, “Defoe and the Narrative of 
Exchange,” in Models of Value: Eighteenth Century Political Economy and the Novel. Durham 
NC: Duke UP, 1996, 87-131.
6. Rousseau notes famously that the ideal first book in a proper education should not be “Aristotle, 
Pliny, or Buffon . . . [but] Robinson Crusoe” (RC 262).
7. I mean to invoke Foucault’s notion of social apparatus, which he called a “dispositif.” For 
Foucault taxonomies of difference are produced from within historically contingent apparatuses of 
knowledge and material domination. For exploration of the complex idea of a dispositif see 
Foucault, Archeology 50-6, 79-134; Gilles Deleuze, “What is a Dispositif?” in Michel Foucault: 
Philosopher. Trans. Timothy J. Armstrong. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, 159-168. For 
a recent discussion of this concept in animal rights discourse and Roman law, see Esposito, “The 
Dispositif of the Person,” Trans. Tim Campbell. Forthcoming in Law, Culture, and the 
Humanities. (2010): MS 1–21.
8. On the connection between post-Marxist thought, biopolitics, and caveats for the conjugation of 
Gramscian terminologies with an adaptation of Agamben, see Laclau, “Bare Life or Social 
Indeterminacy,” in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. Ed. Matthew Calarco and Stephen De 
Caroli. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007, 11-22.
9. cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 63-4. Cary Wolfe has argued that the hand is one in a series of 
signs of species difference. Arguing that the dividing function of the hand extends beyond 
philosophical discourse into scientific discourse with the “romance of the opposable thumb,” 
Wolfe’s account destabilizes the distinction between animality and the human in Derrida through 
a systems-theoretical register. Cary Wolfe, “In the Shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion: Language, 
Ethics, and the Question of the Animal,” in Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of 
Species, and Posthumanist Theory. Chicago: U Chicago P, 2003, 44-96.
10. Wolfe’s account destabilizes the distinction between animality and the human in Derrida 
through a Luhmannian register of second-order observation in Wolfe, Animal Rites, 44-96.
11. cf. Esposito, 44-76.
12. I employ this rhetoric of following in a narrative form and also in a diegetic space in order to 
background that most Derridean tension between suivre and pister. The “Am (More to Follow)” 
that figures in the idiomatic titling of David Wills’s excellent translation of Derrida’s L’animal 
que donc je suis excellently restores this tension between suis [am], suivre [to follow], and pister 
[to trail] that inhabits the deconstruction of humanualism in Derrida’s text. Derrida, L’animal que 
donc je suis. Paris: Galilée, 2006.
13. L. type *domini n-em, deriv. of domini-um property, ownership. Oxford English Dictionary 
2d. 1989.
14. In this formulation, analogies of domination—paternal power over subjects adjacent to 
paternal power over children—are gradually replaced in practice by the modeling of population 
and the analysis of the family as an object of political power. “Prior to the emergence,” Foucault 
notes, “of population, it was impossible to conceive that art of government except on the model of 
the family, in terms of economy conceived as the management of the family.” “Governmentality” 
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in Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984, Volume 3: Power. Ed. James D. Faubion. London: 
Penguin, 2000, 201–222, 216. 
15. Marx theorized the coincidence of the basic conditions of the life and subsistence in the 
process of labor in his essay “Estranged Labor,” even as he reinscribes the species barrier via 
man’s self conscious apprehension of his own conditions. Marx, Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844, 111-3.
16.  cf. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 239-264.
17. “The law of reason makes the Indian his who hath killed it.” Locke, Two Treatises, 307.
18. cf.  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 51-74.
19. For the mimetic function of animals in regard to the recurrence of the fable in eighteenth 
century England in a number of recent essays, see Frank Palmeri, “The Autocritique of Fables,” 
and Richard Nash, “Animal Nomenclature: Facing Other Animals.”
20. It was Carl Schmitt who attempted to establish the continuity between space and law in 
modern as well as ancient jurisprudence. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International 
Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum. Trans. G. L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press, 2006.
21. As Joseph notes, Roxana’s “narrative strategy” of individualism through sexuality “resembles 
[Crusoe’s] conjuring with Robinson Crusoe on the Island.” Betty Joseph, Reading the East India 
Company, 37.
22. As Mauss observes, the latin word most denotatively translated as “thing” [res], is best traced 
etymologically to a Sanskrit word for gift: Latin- res, sanskrit rah/rahti. See Mauss, The Gift, 50. 
23. Marx makes this argument in the section on primitive accumulation that closes the first 
volume of Capital. Clearly I do not intend to take umbrage with the notion that enclosure reform 
results in the simultaneous emergence of privacy and alienation. Rather, as I have been arguing, 
this contention must analyzed in relation to the subjection of life.  Marx, Capital, 369.
24. cf. Haraway. When Species Meet, 165.
25. Nash has discussed eighteenth-century animal nomenclature and Poll’s status as mimetic being 
at length in his “Animal Nomenclature,” 107-8. Armstrong discusses Poll’s speech in terms of 
Lockean and Cartesian models of consciousness in What Animals Mean, 18-21.
26. This is no doubt a consequence of the influence of Max Novak’s admittedly brilliant analysis 
of the correspondence between Locke and Robinson Crusoe and the effects the latter was to 
produce subsequently. Novak rightly argues that Crusoe narrativizes the emergence of utility in 
such an isolated situation as a distant island. Novak also discusses Marx’s argument that exchange 
is presupposed even in such conditions, as I have earlier remarked, in Novak, Economics and the 
Fiction of Daniel Defoe, 54-59.
27.  Bit. n. 1608 {emem} Belm. Lond. III. 122 Coiners..vulgus, Bit-makers. In the eighteenth 
century the bit was generally the old Mexican real value of a dollar or about 6d. sterling; later 
values assigned are a half pistareen or of a dollar, of a dollar, and (in some colonies) the value of 
1d. sterling. (Gomes Cassidy and Brock Le Page 44)
28. What I here call “parenthetical colonialism” conjugates an important dialogue that animal 
studies might pursue with such a postcolonialist as Joseph, who points out that “[f]eminist critique 
of mainstream historiography has revealed that when the subject of history is normatively male, 
sexual difference appears as an agent of historical causation.” One might add to Joseph’s fine 
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point the observation that when the subject of history is carnally male, sexual difference appears 
as the erasure of gift exchange, for instance at the moment when “Defoe’s Roxana (1724) stages 
the self-constitution of its female protagonist against the background of British commercial 
expansion.” Reading the East India Company, 4, 32.
29. The wild Cat’s gendering as a “she” can also be read as a resonance of contemporary 
figurations of non-productive economies as feminine, for instance in the satirical image of “Dame 
Credit.” Kimberly S. Latta, “The Mistress of the Marriage Market: Gender and Economic 
Ideology in Defoe’s Review,” in ELH 69:2 (2002): 359-83.
30. cf. Brace, Idea of Property, 76-80.
31. cf. Bataille, Theory of Religion. New York: Zone Books, 1989.
32. Roberto Esposito, “For a Philosophy of the Impersonal,” Trans. Timothy Campbell, 
forthcoming in Centennial Review, (2010): MS 1–15, 9. Citations are from the manuscript 
pagination. The translator has given permission for these citations.
33. Esposito, “The Dispositif of the Person,” Trans. Tim Campbell. Forthcoming in Law, Culture, 
and the Humanities (2010): MS 1–21, 11.Citations are from the manuscript pagination. The 
translator has given permission for these citations.
34.  Esposito notes that “no one in Rome was a full-fledged person from the beginning of life nor 
did one remain a person forever,” limning not only ancient forms of slavery, but also the transition 
from fili to patres, and other transformations in age, class, condition, property ownership that 
variously transformed the relation between life and citizenship in the classical scene. Esposito, 
“The Dispositif of the Person,” 11.
35. cf. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon, 2007.
36. Esposito has in mind here, for instance, the way the Utilitarian philosophy of life espoused 
most famously by as Peter Singer, “unambiguously accept[s] the Roman doctrine of the initial 
distinction between person and non-person, through the intermediate stages of the quasi-person, 
the semi-person and the temporary person.” Esposito, “For a Philosophy of the Impersonal,” 9.
37. cf. Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2001, 27-8, 235-
8.
38. cf.  Judith Butler, Precarious Life: Powers of Mourning and Violence. New York: Verson, 
2006, 50-100.
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